Stories tagged with "decline rate"

Analysis of Decline Rates (Part II)

"Khebab" has changed his TOD nom de plume--to his real name, Sam Foucher. He will be using his real name in the future, so his articles are easier to cite when they are used as references. His name has been changed in all of his old articles as well.

In the first part, we tried to estimate the implicit decline structure behind the IEA analysis of worldwide decline rates. We established that only 11.8 mbpd of a total of 69.8 mbpd were not in decline in 2007 (17.0%) and for the Super-Giants/Giants group, the IEA claims that around 20% (9.2 / 42.5) are still growing fields. I'm now trying to answer the following question: is the decline structure observed for the world and the SG/G group closer to a pre-peak or a post peak production? 

Based on the only field-by-field datasets publicly available (Norway and the UK) and looking at the decline structure we came to the following conclusion: If the decline structure for the world follows the decline structure that has been observed for UK+Norway, there is an 85% chance that the world's oil production is in final decline. 

Analysis of Decline Rates

This post offers a kind of reverse engineering of what numbers could be behind the long and detailed IEA decline analysis in their last report (2008 IEA WEO). A tentative decline structure for the post-peak Super-Giant and Giants oilfields is offered as well as a possible scenario for future production. The conclusions are:

  1. It seems that the yearly decline rate of the post-peak resource base may accelerate  to 10% until 2011 and then stabilize back toward 4.35%. This acceleration is due to the rapid decline rates for Large and Small oil fields (around 10%). Coincidentally, this value is the total decline rate value implicitly used by the IEA in their final forecast (see discussion here).
  2. 83.0% of the 2007 conventional oil resource base (69.8 mbpd in 2007) is coming from post-peak fields.
  3. The contribution from Super-Giants, Giants may have reached a broad plateau around 41 mbpd.
  4. Production may slide rapidly over 3-4 years past 2009 due to a short bust in decline of the resource base then reach a gentler decline regime past 2012.

Warning, It's a long post with a lot of charts.

IEA WEO 2008 - World Oil Forecasts using Wikipedia Megaprojects, Dec 2008

In this analysis, Samuel Foucher (“Khebab”) and I (Tony Eriksen or “ace”) present an update of Wikipedia Megaprojects data. We also provide forecasts of future oil production, reflecting the Megaprojects data. The IEA uses megaprojects in its analysis and we reconcile our Megaprojects information to the data they provide in their report.

A wide variety of methods can be used to forecast future oil production. Each will provide different indications. Sam and I each make projections with megaprojects data, using somewhat different methods. Sam’s projections are shown in Figure 6. My forecasts are shown in Figures 8, 9, and 10. Despite our differing methods, the indications we produce are all substantially lower than the indications of the IEA.

Until quality data about production history, reserves and future development plans including capacities are obtained for fields in secretive OPEC countries, forecasts beyond 2012 are highly uncertain, regardless of the source. While quality data remain unavailable, the world's future energy security, in particular liquid fuels supply security, remains an extremely high risk.

This chart shows the IEA WEO 2008 forecast together with Sam's forecast derived from using Megaprojects sanctioned capacities and yet to be sanctioned capacities (including yet to find oil - YTF). By 2020, the IEA's forecast is significantly greater than Sam's forecast.

Fig 1 - Possible Future Supply Capacity Scenario for Crude Oil and NGL

The 2008 IEA WEO - Production Decline Rates

Report authors: Euan Mearns, Samuel Foucher and Rembrandt Koppelaar



This chart is from a section of the IEA publications called key graphs and appears in Chapter 11, p250 as Figure 11.1.

Chapter 10, p 243 of IEA WEO 2008 says this:

On this basis, we estimate that the average observed decline rate worldwide is 6.7%. Were that rate applied to 2007 crude oil production the annual loss of output would be 4.7mmbpd.

So it seems reasonable to expect the decline rate on currently producing fields shown above should be 6.7%. Not so. The decline rate in the chart above seems to be much closer to 4%. So what's going on here? There's more below the fold.

Asking one of the less comfortable questions about our energy future...

In my last post I talked a little about the media’s normal pre-disposition to ask relatively comfortable questions about the state of oil (and natural gas) supply, with the consequence that some of the more difficult questions and those with more painful answers don’t get asked very often. The painful questions take one beyond the current concerns on the ability of supply to match demand at a reasonable price, to the point where oil production can longer increase in absolute volume, and then on to the point where overall production starts to decline. It is an issue that Euan and the TOD Europe group are beginning to ably document, as they outline the problems that Europe will face. It is a point that is illustrated in the recent post on the Megaproject update by Khebab, and more specifically in the comments on that post. But what I would add to that, and ask, as a painful question, is as to whether the projection is overly optimistic.

Ken Deffeyes, who did so much to bring this current situation to our attention with his writing and books, who has said that he is no longer a prophet, but has become a historian. His remark implies that the much of the debate over peak oil is perhaps over. And there I would disagree with him, because I remain critically concerned, as Euan is, that the world does not really understand the size of the problem that is approaching, and the speed of that arrival. Further the information that controls the shape of the production curve, post peak is usually derived relating to the pattern of the peak in the United States. To anticipate that the world curve will look the same, overlooks the critical difference that, at the present time, there is no satisfactory alternative fuel to satisfy demand. Thus the market imperatives to extract more oil in the immediate short term to meet needs may over-ride more rational concerns about achieving maximum ultimate recovery by producing the oil more slowly. This is a different situation than that which held over the time that the American production plot was developed, and alternate supplies of oil were available from abroad.

Help us List Megaprojects

New liquids capacity with first oil in 2003 as estimated from Petroleum Review MegaProject report in Jan 2004, and estimate from Wikipedia table as of November 25th, 2007.

Estimating the World Production Decline Rates from the Megaproject Forecasts

Oil production is highly pyramidal and almost half of the world production is coming from less than 3% of the total number of oilfields. Therefore, tracking large oil projects seems like a good approach and it is generally easy to gather good information about a few hundreds of important projects. The most notorious studies are from Chris Skrebowski (ODAC) that has tracked megaprojects since 2004 (see references at the bottom of this post). Initially, only projects that could produce 100 kbpd and more were included. In 2007, the last update included also 40,000 bpd and more. However, forecasted increases in new production capacity have been overly optimistic. So what went wrong? They are many possible causes: demand destruction due to high prices, significant project delays, withheld capacity, larger decline of the resource base, etc..  Having a good estimate of the decline rate of the resource base (Most estimates are ranging between 2 and 6%/year) is fundamental for the precision of supply forecasts derived from megaproject database (see Rembrandt's recent post). Stuart is also looking at this problem here.

ASPO Houston: Day 1, part 1

As happened at the last ASPO meeting in Boston, the Conference organizers had arranged for a mystery reporter to act at the end of today’s papers as a Mystery “Guest Responder,” to review and comment on the papers of the day. It turned out to be James Kunstler , and while I had hoped his summary might have made it easier to cover a day where there was a vast quantity of information, and though he gave a concise and effective summary, our views on what was most interesting appear to differ quite a bit. And so, gentle readers, you are stuck once again with my perception. But since there are a lot of TOD readers and contributors here (a pleasure to put a face to the name) please do chip in with your views and comments, particularly if you disagree with what I write.

The atmosphere seemed a little different today, perhaps the influence of more “energy professionals”, investment advisors and professionals made it seem more of a business conference, perhaps the nature of the message that came at us as the papers proceeded were a sobering influence. After the ASPO meeting in Cork I had become a little more worried about the approaching problems, and had, as I noted, begun to see 2009 and 90 mbd as the critical numbers. Today I think I added the first twinge of terror to my emotional lexicon. We talk about it with an academic dispassion, we list the numbers and plot the curves but the numbers that we heard today have an immediacy and an impact that indicate the anonymity with which we exist in many media is perhaps going to change sooner than many of us have anticipated. This was the day of revising numbers, of reviewing past data in light of the changes since last year, and so let me, “start at the beginning” with the first paper of the day.

Homework Assignment: Rates of Decline of the Largest Fields

After yesterday's discussion of on-stream production growth (or the lack thereof), it would seem apropos that we follow that up with a discussion of the existing largest fields and their decline rates.

Greyzone and others worked a while back to assemble as much data as they could about the largest producing oil fields, their peak year, and whether or not they were in decline, and if so, the decline rate.

I thought I'd repost this as a discussion point, but also to accomplish two other goals: 1) can we expand this to the top 50 fields easily? is that a worthwhile exercise? and 2) is there any more data out there that can fill in the blanks (note that most of the missing data is from SA) that are present?

Here's a link to the data, and here's a link to the original thread that started this all.

Exxon, and the Implications of 8%

Most of us thinking about peak oil have been aware for some time that the central uncertainty is the decline rate on fields in production (FIP). This dramatically affects when one believes peak will be, and seems to be the main difference between more pessimistic projections such as Chris Skrebowski's , and CERA's. It's also critically important in assessing the economic impact, since the faster total production declines, the harder it will be for the economy to adjust, and as we go further and further past peak, the fewer new projects there will be to add to the declining bulk of production.

In the past, peak oil projections have used fairly low decline rates for FIP - 3%-6%. There are now several pieces of evidence that the FIP decline rate might be more like 8%. Adding that to Chris Skrebowski's list of new projects makes for a very rough ride:

Production projection with 2005 ODAC Megaprojects plus various average decline rates of existing fields and the supply required to maintain "business as usual".